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Prior work suggests coordination failure between labour and education markets leads some 
workers to have educational qualifications in excess of those specified for the job 
(overeducation) and others to have less (undereducation). This paper empirically models and 
tests the hypothesis that overeducation and undereducation arise out of a hedonic matching 
process that maximises net benefits to workers and firms over the life of the match. 
Specifically, the overeducated begin in low-paying, entry-level jobs early in their careers that 
prepare them for higher-paying future positions that require their educational background, 
whereas the undereducated start in lower -paying, exactly-educated jobs that can signal skills 
necessary for promotion. The empirical model shows that, because all workers are exactly-
educated during at least a portion of their career, the type of educational match cannot be 
directly identified using a cross-section, but may be imputed from the differences between 
predicted and observed qualifications of the worker and predicted and observed requirements 
of the firm. The empirical analysis uses a rich cross-section of British working-age males to 
identify match types.  Using contemporaneous, forward- and backward-looking data, we 
confirm that over and undereducated matches differ in their on-the-job training and 
promotion opportunities, which yield a trade-off in the pre- versus post-match return to 
human capital. 
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 Over the last two decades there has been much concern by researchers and policy 
makers over the apparent lack of coordination between the labour market and the educational 
system that leads some workers to have educational qualifications in excess of those specified 
for the job (overeducation) and others to have less (undereducation).  Cross-sectional studies 
using U.S., European, and Asian data sources indicate that between 30 and 40 percent of 
workers have educational qualifications that either exceed or fall short of firm requirements 
at  a particular point in time (e.g., Sicherman, 1991; Alba -Ramirez, 1993; Ng 2001). 
Moreover, a meta-analysis by Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000b) shows no 
significant change in the extent of this apparent skill mismatch between workers and firms 
over the last 20 years.  Thus, overeducation and undereducation appear to be pervasive and 
persistent phenomena in industrialised countries. 
 A large empirical literature treats both overeducation and undereducation as evidence 
of an imbalance in the supply of and demand for skills (Rumberger 1981 and 1987; 
Manacorda and Petrongolo, 2000).  For example, short-run coordination failure between 
worker qualifications and firm requirements could occur if rapid technological advancement 
draws educated workers into jobs traditionally held by lower-skilled workers who cannot 
readily acquire more education (Borghans and de Grip, 2000).  Mismatch in the skills market 
is supported by a number of empirical wage studies that include years of required education 
and measures of whether the worker has more or less education than required.  These studies 
find that workers whose qualifications equal firm requirements earn a higher return to 
education than those who do not (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Hersch,1991; Vahey 2000). 
 Recently, two equilibrium rationales have been proposed for the presence of 
overeducation.  First, several papers examine whether worker qualifications might exceed 
firm requirements due to the substitutability or complementarity between education and on-
the-job training (Mendes de Oliveira et al, 2000).  Workers might be identified as 
overeducated if, for example, education and on-the-job training are substitutes in production 
such that job entrants who possess more than the minimum educational requirements do not 
require further training.  While not explicitly studied in prior work, substitutability between 
education and on the job training could also lead to undereducation if workers can use on-the-
job training as a substitute for formal education. On the other hand, complementarity between 
education and training could imply human capital differences increase throughout a career 
because well-educated workers benefit more from training.  An empirical paper by van 
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Smoorenburg and van der Velden (2000) finds that substitutability and complementarity 
between initial education and on-the-job training are both possible and depend on factors 
such as the match between the job and field of study and the “narrowness” of educational 
training. 
 Secondly, several papers model overeducation as a result of career mobility. For 
example, Sicherman and Galor (1990) develop a theoretical model in which workers start in 
jobs for which they are overeducated in exchange for a higher probability of moving up the 
job hierarchy. They test this hypothesis using data for working-age males from the 1976-81 
waves of the PSID and find that the correlation between the effect of education on wages and 
its effect on the probability of moving to a “better” job is negative and significa nt. This result 
suggests that overeducated workers trade off a lower return to education for an increased 
probability of promotion.  Nonetheless, equilibrium rationales have not been put forward for 
the presence of undereducated workers. 
In this paper, career mobility and possible tradeoffs between education and on-the -job 
training arise in a hedonic matching model where worker skills can meet, exceed, or fall short 
of stated job requirements in equilibrium. Specifically, a discrete hedonic matching model 
shows that worker and firm heterogeneity elicit different match types, and only some worker-
firm pairings yield a match where it is jointly optimal for worker qualifications to equal firm 
requirements over all periods of the match (i.e., an exactly-educated type match). The optimal 
matching process can also yield overeducated- and undereducated-type matches in which 
worker qualifications match firm requirements only for a portion of the time the worker and 
firm are matched, which could give rise to overeducation or undereducation in a cross-
section.  The model predicts that overeducated-type matches begin with workers in lower-
paying, entry-level jobs early in their career that train them for higher-paying future positions 
that require their educational background, whereas undereducated-type matches start with 
workers in lower -paying jobs for which they are exactly educated and that provide them the 
opportunity to acquire training and signal that they have the necessary skills for promotion 
into a higher-paying job. 
A crucial outcome of the model is that all workers are predicted to have worker 
qualifications that meet firm requirements at some point during the match.  This implies that 
prior work, which has relied on the observed educational match in a cross-section or a short 
panel, may have misidentified the match type of some workers whose qualifications meet 
firm requirements, because these workers could be in an overeducated- or undereducated-
type of match as we have defined it. Our discrete hedonic matching model builds on prior 
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work by providing a method to impute the match type from the difference between predicted 
and observed qualifications of the worker and the predicted and observed requirements of the 
firm that can be derived from a jointly-estimated ordered probit model of worker 
qualifications and firm requirements.  We estimate a joint-ordered probit model using 
uniquely-detailed data for British working-age males contained in the Social Change and 
Economic Life Initiative survey (SCELI), which is  used to predicted the worker match type 
(i.e., overeducated, undereducated, and exactly educated).  The predicted match types 
correctly identify the majority of workers who are observed to be overeducated and 
undereducated, and indicate that a significant portion of workers who are observed to be 
exactly-educated are not in an exactly-educated type match. 
The predicted match types are used in a second set of empirical analyses that takes 
advantage of the forward-looking and backward-looking data contained in SCELI to examine 
whether past or future opportunities for on-the-job training and promotions differ as expected 
across the match types.  In addition, several wage equations examine whether those workers 
in overeducated and undereducated-match types have steeper wage profiles than those in 
exactly-educated match types, reflecting the expected trade off between a lower pre-match 
return to human capital and a higher post-match acquisition of human capital and subsequent 
promotion return.  The results provide some of the first formal evidence that overeducation 
and undereducation can occur in labour market equilibrium and that an empirical assessment 
of worker-firm matches needs to take account of the fact that a match occurs over multiple 
periods. 
II. Empirical Model 
A. Two Illustrations of Career Mobility 
 By definition, overeducation or undereducation occur when the observed educational 
qualifications of the worker (Q) do not match the stated educational requirements for the job 
(R) at a given time. However, a worker -firm match often occurs over multiple periods and, 
thus, may reflect the objectives of the worker and the firm over the life of the match and not 
just for a single period. We develop a simple empirical hedonic matching model that shows 
an overeducated-type (undereducated-type) match yields Q>R (Q<R) for some portion of the 
time the worker and the firm are matched and results from the fact that these workers move 
up the job-skill hierarchy with experience. To lay a foundatio n for the empirical model it is 
useful to begin with two simple illustrations where career mobility can yield an 
overeducated- or an undereducated-type of match. 
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 There are a number of practical examples of an overeducated-type match. For 
example, most U.K. police officers enter the force with secondary school qualifications, 
which qualify them to be a patrol officer. However, some people enter the police force with a 
university degree. These workers generally begin their career as a patrol officer because this 
experience improves their subsequent performance when they are promoted into jobs that 
require their qualifications, such as a detective. Thus, university-educated patrol officers 
accept jobs for which they are overeducated in exchange for training and an expected future 
promotion into a job for which they are exactly educated. 
 Alternatively, whereas most detectives have a university degree, some patrol officers 
with only secondary school qualifications are promoted to detective because their on-the-job 
experience in the field reveals that they have the necessary skills and personal attributes to be 
a successful detective. These secondary school-educated detectives begin in a patrol officer 
job for which they are exactly educated but are promoted into jobs for which they may be 
viewed as undereducated because their qualifications are below those of many detectives who 
have a university degree. It follows that the experience of these secondary school-educated 
detectives substitute for the skills and/or the signal of ability provided by a university degree 
and permit them to move up the job hierarchy.  
 Though both the secondary school-educated and the university-educated officers may 
be promoted from the status of patrol officer to that of detective, the career paths are likely to 
differ in terms of the speed with which promotions are secured. Whereas the university-
educated officers may have already been identified as candidates for detective positions and 
are more likely to receive both training and promotions as an inducement to stay in the police 
force rather than enter other occupations, secondary school-educated officers are hired with 
no observed skills to differentiate them from others in their police academy cohort.   
Consequently, they must rely on the development of their on-the -job skills and demonstrated 
ability to signal promotion readiness. Thus, whereas both categories of officers may in time 
reach the desired objective of detective status, university-educated officers are likely to be 
promoted with less experience than secondary school-educated officers.  Moreover, those 
who are likely to do well as a university-educated (secondary school-educated) detective are 
more likely to self-select into this profession and accept the trade-off of some initial 
“mismatch” (further training and demonstration of ability) to receive the wage increase 
associated with promotion. 
 These simple illustrations highlight two important points. First, they suggest that 
standard wage equations may confound the pre- versus post-match return to human capital, 
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because the pre-match level of human capital can affect subsequent opportunities for on-the-
job training and promotion. In fact, these illustrations suggest that the wage profile may be 
steeper for workers in an ove reducated- or undereducated-type of match. Specifically, a 
university-educated patrol officer accepts a lower-skilled position in order to obtain the 
requisite training and subsequent promotion to detective. Thus, whereas this overeducated 
worker would likely initially earn more if he or she matched in a job that required a 
university degree, the worker trades off an initially low return to education for a subsequent 
promotion return (e.g., Sicherman and Galor, 1990).  Likewise, a secondary school-educated 
patrol officer who is promoted to detective is likely to experience faster salary growth than 
one who is not promoted to detective. In both cases, the greater wage growth likely reflects 
heterogeneity across firms in the opportunity for promotion and heter ogeneity across workers 
in their willingness to acquire on-the -job training and their ability to take advantage of such 
promotion opportunities throughout their career. 1 
 Second, these illustrations suggest that workers who are observed to have Q>R or 
Q<R at a particular point in time do not constitute the full set of workers who are in an 
overeducated- or undereducated-type of match. In particular, the illustrations show that the 
pool of exactly-educated workers may include, in addition to workers who are exactly-
educated throughout their career, previously overeducated workers who have been promoted 
into exactly-educated jobs or undereducated-type workers who are (at present) exactly 
educated because they have yet to move up the job ladder. Prior work has not distinguished 
between these groups of exactly-educated workers, but instead has compared workers who 
are observed to be overeducated or undereducated with those who are observed to be exactly-
educated at a particular point in time. This identification problem is further compounded by 
the fact that traditional data sources do not permit a direct test of the possible differences in 
labour market outcomes among match types, since the expected transition to or from an 
exactly-educated job by overeducated- and undereducated-type workers is not necessarily 
observed in a cross -section or a short panel. 
 Our empirical model suggests a possible means of indirectly distinguishing the 
overeducated, undereducated, and exactly-educated type of match within a cross-section by 
comparing the discrete, observed educational qualifications of the worker (Q) and the 
                                                              
1 It is important to note, however, that overeducat ed- and undereducated-type jobs that offer a potential 
promotion return would be more desirable than those for which the worker is exactly-educated throughout a 
career, all else being equal. Thus, from a market perspective, these jobs would have to pay less early on in a 
career to ensure that jobs that require “similarly-educated” workers have the same life-cycle earnings. These 
market pressures would tend to reinforce the steeper wage profile for workers who are in overeducated- and 
undereducated-type matches versus those who are exactly educated throughout a career.  
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discrete, educational requirements of the firm (R) with their predicted, continuous values (Q* 
and R*) that exploit the information in the observed match between workers and firms. In 
particular, the empirical model shows how the match type can be identified by firm 
heterogeneity in the match between R and R*, controlling for the observed qualifications of 
the worker, and worker heterogeneity in the match between Q  and Q*, controlling for the 
observed requirements of the firm. 2 
B. The Worker Qualification and Firm Requirement Choice 
 The analysis first considers workers’ utility-maximizing qualification choice and 
firms’ profit-maximizing requirement choice in isolation before considering the joint 
matching process.  It is important to note that, whereas the match occurs over time, we 
assume for simplicity that the educational choice of the worker and the requirement choice of 
the firm are made once and do not change over the course of the match.  Moreover, although 
the joint matching process between workers and firms is likely to imply a strong correlation 
between Q and R , we assume the qualification choice of the worker and the requirement 
choice of an individual firm are made prior to the match and are independent.  Nonetheless, 
the expected correlation between Q and R is explicitly part of the hedonic matching model. 
For the qualification decision, human capital theory assumes that individuals choose 
their education level in order to maximize utility, which depends on the rate of return to 
education. To formalize this process, we adopt a random utility approach where an individual 
i obtains a level of education, *iQ , if the utility from this choice exceeds that of its 
alternatives. The actual level of education for individual i, *iQ , is unobserved and is modelled 
as a linear index function: 
iii XQ ea +¢=
*           (1) 
where a’  is a vector of parameters associated with personal, family-background, and labour 
market measures, Xi, that determine the rate of return to education, and ei is a normally -
distributed error term that measures individual-specific random variation in the education 
level.  In other words, (1) indicates that workers choose *iQ  based on the rate of return to 
education, which depends on factors such as personal ability and attitudes towards work,  
 
                                                              
2 Bauer (2002) uses a large German panel data set to show that the difference in the returns to over- and 
undereducation disappears after controlling for differences in unobserved heterogeneity, which suggests that 
wages may reflect characteristics of the match that are known to workers and firms but not generally observed 
by the econometrician.  Likewise, Robst (1995) shows that the likelihood of being overeducated declines with a 
measure of college quality, which again suggests wage heterogeneity in the match. 
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family access to financial and human capital, and differences in the job mix and job market 
information of local labour markets. 
 The optimal education level in (1) is continuous, but a qualification is obta ined when 
a worker’s education level meets or surpasses a discrete, externally-verifiable threshold. For 
example, in England an individual must attend school from age 5 until age 16, at which point 
they can sit GCSE exams. However, a student who continues on to age 18 can take exams 
that, if passed, yield a superior secondary school qualification (i.e. ‘A’ levels). At the same 
time, students who have one year of university have not crossed the threshold for a university 
degree and thus their secondary school qualifications are their highest qualification. 
 In our data the observed qualification levels are comprised of three ordered values, the 
government minimum education level (Qi=0 ), at least one A-level or equivalent (Qi=1 ), and 
a university degree (Q i=2). Thus, following our subsequent empirical analysis, equation (1) 
can then be expressed as: 
0'0 £+= iii XifQ ea        (2.1) 
0'1 >+³= iiAi XifQ eam        (2.2) 
Aiii XifQ mea >+= '2        (2.3) 
Equations (2.1) through (2.3) form the basis of an ordered-probit model of qualification 
choice for individual i. Qi is the qualification level that results from the latent, utility-
maximizing education level. 
 Likewise, following producer theory, we assume that a firm hires workers with a 
given education level in order to maximize profits. Like the individual model, the profit-
maximizing education level for a worker in a given job ( *kR ) is unobserved and is expressed 
as a linear index function: 
kkk uZR +¢= b
*          (3) 
where ß’ is a vector of coefficients for a set of firm, job, and labour market characteristics, Zk, 
that affect the return to a given education level, and uk is a normally-distributed error term 
that measures firm-specific random variation in the return.  In other words, (3) indicates that 
qualifications, *kR , based on their benefits to the firm, which depends on factors such as how 
firm and job attributes affect the net return to educatio n and how labour-market conditions 
affect the cost of changing educational requirements. 
 Although the education level is continuous, a qualification requirement is the smallest 
discrete qualification that is sufficient to properly perform the job. For example, a firm may 
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require a university degree because a secondary school qualification does not provide the 
necessary skills to perform the job properly. On the other hand, while a university degree 
may be sufficient, one year of university may be what is necessary to properly perform the 
job. Thus, the stated educational qualification may exceed what is necessary to properly 
perform the job, particularly if on-the-job training can substitute for formal education. 
 These data, like that for individual qualif ications, includes three possible requirement 
levels. Thus, the firm’s qualification choice can be represented as an ordered-probit model 
using (3): 
0'0 £+= kkk uZifR b        (4.1) 
0'1 >+³= kkRk uZifR bm        (4.2) 
Rkkk uZifR mb >+= '2        (4.3) 
where Rk represents the discrete required qualification level that is necessary to properly 
perform the job, which must meet or exceed the latent, profit -maximizing education level, 
*
kR .   
C. The Q-R Matching Process 
The error term in the individual’s qualification equation, ei , reflects heterogeneity in 
the skill of a worker of a given qualification level.  Similarly, the error term in the firm’s 
requirement equation, uk, reflects heterogeneity in the necessary job skills for firms with a 
given requirement level.  Although the correlation between the error terms is not perfect, our 
expectation (which is confirmed by subsequent empirical analysis) is that the error terms are 
positively correlated:  a worker with unusually high skills (i.e., a high value for ei) is likely to 
match with a firm with unusually high requirements (i.e., a high value for uk).  Our estimation 
procedure takes account of the correlation between the errors by estimating the two sets of 
equations (2 and 4) simultaneously.   
Our model provides an explanation for this correlation.   For example, our previous 
illustrations suggest that workers may initially match in jobs with lower requirements that 
provide training and/or a signal that permits them to move up the job-skill hierarchy in a 
subsequent period.  Thus, a worker with a low value for ei is likely to match with a firm with 
a low value for u k.  This correlation thus provides some information regarding the match type.  
The observed qualification of the worker is Q and the predicted qualification from the jointly 
estimated ordered probit model is Q*.  Q* reflects the correlation of worker qualifications 
with the matching firm’s requirements.  If a firm provides career mobility through training 
and signalling, then its low value for uk will lead to a predicted worker qualification level that 
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is lower than the actual value:  Q* < Q.  Similarly, if a worker has an unusually high skill 
level, then his high value for ei leads to a predicted firm requirement level that is higher than 
the actual value:  R * > R.  The match types can be identified by the differences between Q 
and Q* and R and R*, because these differences vary systematically across the match types. 
First, consider an overeducated match such as a university-educated detective who 
initially places in a patrol officer job that requires a secondary school qualification but 
provides training for detective work. If the match is considered from the perspective of the 
worker’s optimization problem, the observed qualification of a university degree is likely to 
be greater than would be predicted for a typical worker in a patrol officer’s job. In other 
words, controlling for the type of job, workers who find it utilit y-maximizing to be in an 
overeducated-type match are more likely to place in a job such that the observed qualification 
exceeds the predicted qualification, Q>Q*. However, from the perspective of the firm’s 
optimization problem, the observed requirement of  a secondary school qualification for a 
patrol officer’s job is likely to be less than would be predicted for a typical worker who has a 
university degree.  Specifically, controlling for the type of worker, firms that find it profitable 
to be in an overeducated-type match are more likely to hire a worker such that the observed 
requirement exceeds the predicted requirement, R<R*. 
 Second, consider an undereducated match such as a patrol officer with a secondary 
school education who has been promoted into a detective job that typically requires a 
university degree. From the perspective of the worker’s optimization problem, the observed 
secondary school qualification is likely to be less than would be predicted for a typical 
detective. In other words, controlling for the type of job, workers who find it utility-
maximizing to be in an undereducated-type match are more likely to place in a job such that 
the observed qualifications are less than the predicted qualifications, Q<Q*. From the 
perspective of the firm’s optimization problem, the observed requirement of a university 
degree is likely to exceed the predicted requirement for a typical detective. Specifically, 
controlling for the type of worker, firms that find it profitable to be in an undereducated-type 
match are more likely to hire a worker such that the observed requirements exceed the 
predicted requirements, R>R*. 
 The overeducated- and undereducated-type matches can be compared to one in which 
there is relatively little movement up the job hierarchy such that the worker and firm expect 
to have the qualifications equal the requirements throughout the life of the match. 
Specifically, controlling for the type of job, the observed qualification of a particular worker 
equals the predicted qualification of other workers in similar jobs such that, Q=Q*. Likewise, 
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controlling for the type of worker, the observed requirement for a particular job equals the 
predicted requirements of other workers who are similarly educated, R=R*. The exactly-
educated match forms the base case where Q=Q* and R=R*, which compares to an 
overeducated-type of match where Q>Q* and R<R* and an undereducated-type of match 
where Q<Q* and R>R*. 
 The ordered probit models for Q and R specified above can be estimated 
simultaneously to control for the correlation in the observed matching process.  The 
coefficients from the jointly estimated ordered probit models along with the observed 
attributes of the firm and the worker are used to predicted Q* and R* that condition on the 
observed match.  The predicted and observed values of Q  and  R are then used to identify the 
match type. 
How effectively the model identifies the type of match is tested empirically by 
examining whether the predicted match types yield the expected differences in training, 
promotion and wages.  Specifically, our illustration suggests that workers in overeducated- or 
undereducated-type matches are more likely to receive training early in their career and move 
up the job hierarchy than their exactly-educated counterparts who are comparably -placed and 
educated.  Because the opportunities for training and promotion depend on where the person 
is in their career path, the empirical analysis makes use retrospective data that looks back at 
training and promotion opportunities in the past and uses forward-looking data that ask 
workers about their expectations for training and promotion in the future in order to construct 
a picture of how these opportunities change over a career.  In addition, wage regressions are 
estimated to test the hypothesis that both overeducated- and undereducated-type workers 
initially place into lower paying positions than they might otherwise achieve to subsequently 
achieve stronger wage growth through promotion or higher rates of return to tenure.  Each of 
these empirical specifications include controls for whether the worker is in an overeducated- 
or undereducated-type match versus an exactly-educated-type match that are derived by 
comparing Q versus Q* and R versus R* along the lines predicted by the empirical model. 
IV. The Data and Empirical Specification 
A. The Data Source 
 The data source for the empirical analysis is the Social Change and Economic Life 
Initiative (SCELI) dataset that surveyed 6,110 people in roughly equal numbers from six 
different labour markets – Aberdeen, Coventry, Kirkcaldy, Northampton, Rochdale and 
Swindon.  The data were collected in June and July of 1986, using stratified random sampling 
to obtain a respondent sample representative of British working-age adults. The sample 
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includes wage and salary workers and people who are self-employed, unemployed, or out of 
the labour force. 
 Our data set offers several advantages over other data sources.  Our model implies 
that we must observe workers from the initial time of hire through subsequent promotions to 
detect the effects of overeducation and undereducation.  Although a lengthy, comprehensive 
panel would be ideal for testing the model, existing panel datasets are inadequate.  American 
datasets such as the PSID and CPS are short when compared to the time needed to observe 
the effects implied by our model.  Although British datasets offer the advantage that the 
British educational qualification system yields a reasonably clear classification of 
overeducation and undereducation, they typically include few worker characteristics.  Our 
detailed British cross-sectional dataset provides information on many workers who are at 
different stages in their careers.  The data are unique in their detail of the individual, job, and 
firm attributes which are necessary to conduct the empirical analysis and their inclusion of 
backward-looking and forward-looking questions regarding training and promotion 
opportunities.  Thus, the data allow us to classify workers as being undereducated or 
overeducated, and the variety of workers and firms allows us to infer the effects of the 
matching process on wages, promotions, and worker mobility. 
 The analysis uses a subset of these data that includes 1556 observations for male wage 
and salary workers who report all relevant information. Women are excluded to make our 
analysis comparable to prior work on overeducation (e.g., Cohn and Khan, 1995; Sicherman, 
1991; Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). The self-employed are excluded because the SCELI 
dataset includes only limited information regarding firm and job attributes for these workers. 
Individuals who are unemployed or out of the labour force are excluded for the obvious 
reason that an individual must be employed in order for us to observe differences between Q 
and R. 
B. The Ordered Probit Specification 
  The data are first used to estimate the ordered-probit models. Observed qualifications 
and requirements, Q and R , are delineated as low, medium and high with a numerical 
ordering of 0 through 2. High indicates an advanced degree (i.e., a degree or diploma from a 
university or college), medium indicates either an A -level, an apprenticeship, or an equivalent 
qualification, whereas low indicates none of these qualifications or requirements3. These 
                                                              
3A high qualification includes a Higher National Certificate (Diploma), a University Diploma, a Nursing and 
Teaching Qualification, and other professional, university or CNAA degree. A medium qualification includes a 
General or Scottish Certificate of Education (i.e., an A-level or Higher), a Certificate of Sixth Year Studies, City 
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categories are sufficiently narrow to ensure differences among the Q-R levels (i.e., 2>1>0), 
but are sufficiently broad to ensure that each category has a similar Q  or R (e.g., nurses and 
teachers have a similar level of education). 
 Following the empirical model, the ordered-probit specification for Q  includes family 
attributes that measure access to financial and human capital, and attitudinal/first-job 
attributes that measure labour-market commitment and opportunities, and the ordered-probit 
specification for R includes measures of firm, job and labour market attributes. For brevity, 
the means of the explanatory variables used to estimate the ordered-probit models for Q and 
R are included in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 respectively, as well as for low, medium and high 
levels of Q and R and for the observed match types Q>R, Q=R, and Q<R. Consistent with 
expectations, the descriptive statistics do indicate that overeducated workers tend to be 
younger and undereducated workers older than their exactly-educated counterparts. 
 Maximum-likelihood estimates of the joint ordered-probit models for Q and R are 
presented in Table 1. The estimated correlation coefficient between the errors for Q and R is 
0.573 and is significantly different from zero, which supports the contention that Q and R 
should be estimated simultaneously. However, the correlation coefficient is also significantly 
less than one, which indicates that actual and required qualifications are correlated but the 
match is far from exact. 
 The coefficients on the explanatory variables are generally significant and suggest 
that family background and labour -market opportunities affect the choice of actual 
qualifications whereas firm and job attributes affect required qualifications. Thus, those with 
more successful parents and those who delayed taking on family commitments are more 
likely to have acquired more education, whilst higher level jobs, jobs requiring a longer time 
to master, and jobs in firms which have seen recent reorganisation are likely to require more 
education.  The joint ordered-probit specification is used to predict Q* and R* conditioned on 
the observed match. 
The empirical tests of the model hinge on correctly predicting the match type of each 
worker. Thus, Table 2 presents a comparison between Q* and R* (which are respectively 
defined as the qualification or requirement category that has the maximum joint probability 
from the ordered-probit models) and the observed values of Q  and R for workers who are 
observed to be overeducated (Q>R), exactly-educated (Q=R), and undereducated (Q<R). The 
bold cells in Table 2 indicate that 89 percent of the 303 workers who are observed to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and Guilds, Ordinary National Certificate (Diploma), a Scottish Vocational training degree, a Clerical and 
Commercial or Trade apprenticeship. A low -skill qualification includes all other qualifications. 
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overeducated are predicted to have an overeducated-type of match (i.e., Q>Q* or R<R*). 
Similarly, 89 percent of the 207 workers who are observed to be undereducated are predicted 
to have an undereducated-type of match (i.e., Q<Q* or R>R*). Moreover, whereas the 
majority of exactly -educated workers place in the centre cell where Q*=R*, the 46 percent of 
workers that are predicted to be in the surrounding cells may not be expected to be in an 
exactly-educated match throughout their career. Thus, the results in Table 2 broadly support 
the predictions of the theoretical model regarding the relationship between the predicted 
education level and the actual qualifications and requirements. 
C. The Match-Type Variables 
 The empirical model appears to accurately predict the match type of workers who are 
observed to be overeducated or undereducated. However, whether the empirical model is 
truly effective at identifying the type of match depends on whether it can separate workers 
who are exactly educated throughout their career from those who are presently observed to 
have Q=R but who are in an overeducated- or undereducated-type of match. Specifically, our 
illustrations suggest that workers who are in an overeducated- or an undereducated-type of 
match have greater training and promotion opportunities and steeper wage profiles relative to 
those who are exactly-educated throughout their career. To examine the ability of the 
empirical model to predict the type of match, we utilise the longitudinal aspects of the SCELI 
dataset to model the training and promotion opportunities of the different match types 
predicted by the empirical model, as well as the consequent effect upon earnings. 
 The match type is identified by four dummy variables derived from the predictions of 
the bivariate ordered probit model. These four mutually exclusive career development states 
are: 
1. “OEOE” workers who are predicted to be in an overeducated-type of match (i.e., 
Q>Q* or R<R*) and are observed to be overeducated presumably because they have 
yet to rise up the job hierarchy.  
2. “MATCHOE” workers who are predicted to be in an overeducated-type of match 
(i.e., Q>Q* or R<R*) but are observed to be exactly educated presumably because 
they have risen up the job hierarchy and therefore appear matched on the basis of their 
current match. 
3. “MATCHUE” workers who are predicted to be in an undereducated-type of match  
(i.e., Q<Q* or R>R*) but are observed to be exactly educated presumably because 
they have yet to rise up the job hierarchy and therefore appear matched on the basis of 
their current match.  
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4. “UEUE” workers who are predicted to be in an undereducated-type of match (i.e., 
Q<Q* or R>R*) and are observed to be undereducated presumably because they have 
risen up the job hierarchy.  
The excluded group of workers are those who are predicted to be in an exactly-educated type 
of match (“MATCH” workers) throughout their career.   
The existing educational mismatch literature has tended to implicitly ‘merge’ the 
distinct MATCHOE, MATCH and MATCHUE career development states into one ‘matched’ 
group, ignoring the different career development paths of the MATCHOE and MATCHUE 
respondents and the implications that follow from these differences.  The next section uses 
the four binary match variables in training, promotion, and wage equations to empirically 
examine whether the career path of workers who are predicted to be in an overeducated- and 
undereducated-type match differs from those who are exactly educated.   Although it is likely 
that the identification of the match type is not exact, the coefficients on the match variables in 
the promotion, training and wage models would be biased towards zero and not support the 
model’s predictions to the extent they are imprecise measures of the match type.  In addition 
to the match-type variables, the empirical models include standard control variables used in 
wage and employment models.  Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the 
promotion, training and wage regressions for all workers and disaggregated by match type are 
found in Appendix Table 3. 
V. Human Capital, Promotion, and Wage Results 
A. Training and Experience 
 Table 3 includes the results from two probit models that examine whether the roles of 
on-the-job experience and training differ by match type as expected.  Specifically, the 
dependent variable in column 1 is a forward-looking, binary variable that equals one if the 
worker indicates that experience and training with the current firm is critical for future 
success on the job, whereas the dependent variable in column 2 is a backward-looking, binary 
variable that equals one if the worker indicates that previously acquired experience and 
training is important for current success on the job.  The predicted role of human capital 
depends on the stage of the worker’s career; thus, by using forward- and backward-looking 
data, the analysis can examine the role of human capital over the career path. The results 
indicate that a number of the explanatory variables are significantly related to the dependent 
variable.  Nonetheless, the discussion focuses on the binary match variables for brevity. 
The coefficients on the binary variables measuring the match types are positive in the 
forward-looking human capital specification (column 1, Table 3) suggesting that experience 
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within the firm is relatively important for overeducated- and undereducated-type matches.  
For overeducated type matches, only the coefficient on the OEOE dummy is significant 
suggesting that human capital (or the signal) acquired early on in the match when the worker 
is initially overeducated affects subsequent success on the job, whereas this firm-specific 
experience is less important when the worker has moved up the job hierarchy into an exactly-
educated match.  On the other hand, both of the coefficients for the undereducated type of 
match (i.e., MATCHUE and UEUE) are significant with similar magnitudes.  This result 
suggests that experience on the job is important throughout an undereducated-type match, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that on-the-job training substitutes for formal 
education as workers move up the job hierarchy into a job for which they are undereducated. 
The backward-looking results for the importance of past experience in the current job 
(column 2, Table 3) support those of the forward-looking measures.  Specifically, the 
coefficients on the OEOE and MATCHUE dummies, measuring the two states that are 
expected to occur early in a career path and prior to the worker moving up the job hierarchy, 
are both negative and significant, which supports the contention that these match types 
discount pre-match training and experience.  However, the coefficients on MATCHOE and 
UEUE, measuring the two states that are expected to occur later in a career and after the 
worker has moved up the job hierarchy, are both positive, which supports the contention that 
these matches relatively reward on-the-job experience. Interestingly, only the coefficient on 
UEUE is significantly positive indicating that experience is relatively important for 
undereducated-type workers (e.g., secondary-educated police officers), which is again 
consistent with the hypothesis that on-the -job experience may substitute for formal education.  
The insignificance of the MATCHOE coefficient could reflect the fact that formal education 
is relatively important once the overeducated worker is promoted into an exactly educated job 
(e.g., university-educated detective). 
B. Promotion 
 Table 4 includes the results from a forward-looking and backward-looking discrete 
choice model of promotion.  The explanatory variables are the same as those included in the 
prior human-capital models and a number are significant at traditional levels.  Nonetheless, 
for the sake of brevity the discussion once again focuses on the binary variables measuring 
the match type. 
The dependent variable in the first column is a forward-looking binary variable that 
equals one if the worker reports that he has a good chance of promotion in the next two years.  
The coefficients on three of the four match type variables are positive, but only the 
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coefficient on OEOE is significant at traditional levels.   The positive coefficient on OEOE is 
consistent with expectations, because overeducated-type workers are predicted to be 
overeducated early in their career prior their move up the job hierarchy.  Undereducated-type 
workers who are observed to be exactly-educated are also predicted to eventually move up 
the job hierarchy; the lack of a significant, positive coefficient on MATCHUE may reflect the 
fact that promotion for undereducated type workers, whose promotion may require the 
acquisition of on-the-job experience to substitute for their lack of formal education (e.g., a 
secondary-educated police officer), may take longer than for an overeducated-type worker 
who already has the formal education.  Likewise, the insignificance of coefficients on 
MATCHOE and UEUE may indicate the fact that these workers have already moved up the 
job hierarchy in response to their match. 
The results presented in the second column of Table 4 are from an ordered discrete 
choice model.  Specifically, the dependent variable is an ordered ranking of that compares the 
job segment of the current job with that of the first job.  Specifically, the dependent variable 
takes on a value of –1, 0, or 1 depending on whether the current job is, respectively, in a 
lower job segment, similar job segment, or higher job segment than the first job.  Thus, the 
dependent variable is a backward-looking assessment of the discrete movements within the 
job hierarchy, which is estimated using an ordered-probit model. 
The coefficients on the OEOE and MATCHUE dummies are negative and significant, 
which suggests that overeducated- and undereducated-type workers tend to be in lower socio-
economic job segments than comparable exactly educated workers early in their career.  
However, the coefficients on the MATCHOE and UEUE dummies are positive and 
significant, suggesting that overeducated- and undereducated-type workers tend to experience 
greater movements up the socio -economic job segments than comparable exactly educated 
workers.  Thus, as expected, overeducated- and undereducated-type workers appear to 
experience greater career mobility. 
The coefficients on the OEOE and MATCHUE dummies are negative and significant, 
which suggests that at this early stage in their careers they have yet to see those job changes 
that would bring the promotions to raise them from their current lower level jobs to the higher 
level jobs that we predict for them. Thus, OEOE type workers are still at lower job levels, and 
MATCHUE type workers are still at the same job levels, as comparable exactly educated 
workers. The likelihood that these future promotions will come has been established by 
column 1 of Table 3 and column 1 of Table 4. However, the positive and significant 
coefficients on the MATCHOE and UEUE dummies suggest that these overeducated- and 
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undereducated-type workers have already seen the promotions up the job level hierarchy that 
we predict for them. Thus, MATCHOE type workers are now at the same job levels, and 
UEUE workers are now at higher job levels, than comparable exactly educated workers. 
Thus, as expected, overeducated- and undereducated-type workers appear to experience 
greater career mobility than their exactly-matched counterparts. 
Jointly, the human capital and promotion results support the contention that workers 
in an overeducated- and undereducated-type match trade off a lower initial placement in the 
job hierarchy for on-the -job experience or training that yield a promotion return that arises 
from greater movement up the job hierarchy.  This lower starting position and greater ascent 
up the job hierarchy for overeducated- and undereducated-type workers might be expected to 
yield a lower starting wage arising from either a wage discount to compensate the firm for the 
provision of on-the-job training or an initial discounting of pre-match human capital followed 
by greater wage growth reflecting either a promotion return or a higher-return to post match 
human capital.  This hypothesis is examined next in several wage equations. 
C. Wage Profiles 
 The empirical model predicts that overeducated- and undereducated-type workers will 
have steeper wage profiles. Specifically, overeducated- or undereducated-type workers may 
be viewed as initially placing into lower level jobs that yield a lower return to their pre-match 
human capital (i.e., education and pre-match experience) in exchange for a promotion return.  
Thus, Table 5 presents the results of two earnings equations using the log of weekly earnings 
that include pre-match human capital (distinct from tenure) and interactions of pre-match 
human capital with controls for match type. 4  Once more, for the sake of brevity the focus of 
the discussion is on the match variables.  
The first column of Table 5 presents the results from a log earnings model that 
includes controls for pre-match human capital (i.e., years of education and pre-match 
expe rience) and tenure, but excludes the match type variables.  This specification is used as a 
point of comparison for column 2 that includes controls for the type of educational match.  
Specifically, column 2 includes two variables that measure the number of years of pre-match 
human capital multiplied by the binary variables that indicates whether they are in the early 
stage of the match (i.e., OEOE or MATCHUE workers).  These interaction terms have 
                                                              
4 Weekly earnings are used in the wage models following prior work that suggests that this measure has less 
measurement error than hourly earnings and controls for part -time work unlike annual earnings (e.g., Borjas, 
1980). The number of observations is smaller in the wage equations than in the bivariate ordered probit model 
because some workers do not report their wage. However, the mean Q and R of workers who do and do not 
report their wage does not significantly differ and, thus, is not expected to bias the results in a particular 
direction. 
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significantly negative coefficients and suggest a lower return to pre-match human capital for 
overeducated- and undereducated-type workers early in their career. In addition, the model 
includes two binary variables that equal one if the worker is in an overeducated or 
undereducated type of match.  These match type controls both have a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that overeducated- and undereducated-type workers earn a promotion 
return later in their career.  Interestingly, the initial discount to pre -match human capital plus 
the promotion return is not significantly different from zero at the sample means for 
overeducated or undereducated-type workers suggesting no market advantage from the type 
of match. 
Alternatively, overeducated- or undereducated-type workers may be viewed as trading 
off low initial pay for a higher return to post-match experience (i.e., tenure). Thus, Table 6 
includes a control for post-match tenure (distinct from years of education and pre-match 
experience) and interactions of tenure with controls for match type.  The base specification 
included in column 1 of Table 6 includes years of education, pre-match experience, and post-
match tenure without the controls for match type and yields results similar to previous wage 
specifications using British data sources. 5  
The specification in column 2 of Table 6 includes four controls for match type. 
Specifically, two binary variables are included for workers whom are predicted to be early in 
overeducated or undereducated job match (i.e., OEOE and MATCHUE).  These match 
variables both have a negative sign, supporting the expectation that these workers initially 
earn lower wages. In addition, the model includes the worker’s post-match tenure interacted 
with whether the worker is in an overeducated- or undereducated-type match, which both 
have a positive sign indicating a higher return to tenure for workers in overeducated and 
undereducated types of matches.  Nonetheless, only two of the four match variables are 
significant at traditional levels.  Thus, the interactive specification is broadly consistent with 
the predictions of the empirical model, but yields results that are relatively weak in statistical 
terms. 6 
                                                              
5 The coefficients in the wage equations, although different from those found using U.S. data sources, are typical 
of those found using U.K. data sources with the exception of a relatively low return to education. Our return to 
education estimates are not directly comparable to most U.K. studies that calculate the return using qualification 
dummies and not years of education.  However, Polacheck and Siebert (1993) use data on men and women 
drawn from the 1972 General Household Survey of the U.K. to estimate a wage specification including the 
number of years of education and find a rate of return equal to 6.2 percent. We replicate their specification using 
men and women in SCELI (not presented), which also yields a return to education of 6.2 percent. Thus, the 
results are unlikely to be due to some unique attributes of the SCELI data. 
6 It is interesting that the coefficient on t he tenure variable, while significant in the base specification in column 
1, is insignificant in column 2 and enters significantly only through its interaction with MATCHUE.  This may 
suggest that the observed return to tenure in prior studies may result from those workers who concentrated in 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
 Prior evidence from North America, Europe, and Asia indicates that the educational 
qualifications of up to a third of the world’s workforce either exceed or fall short of the 
employer -specified education requirements for the job.  Our paper provides the first holistic 
empirical examination of the matching process that shows how workers and firms can benefit 
from both an overeducated- or undereducated-type match where worker qualifications do not 
always equal firm requirements. Importantly, the paper demonstrates that, although workers 
and firms may not always be appropriately matched, the degree of mismatch in the labour 
market is likely to be smaller than the 30 percent of workers who are overeducated or 
undereducated at any point in time in the labour market. 
 In addition, our hedonic matching model shows that any comparisons in prior work 
between overeducated or undereducated workers and exactly educated workers using a cross-
section or short panel dataset are likely to be misleading.  Specifically, the overeducated are 
predicted to begin in low -paying, entry-level jobs early in their career that train them for 
higher-paying future positions that require their educational background, whereas the 
undereducated start in low -paying, exactly-educated jobs that, in time, can provide the 
training and signal that the worker has the necessary skills for promotion.  It follows that all 
workers are likely to be exactly educated during some portion of their career, and thus the 
type of educational match cannot be directly observed.  Nonetheless, our empirical model 
demonstrates how the educational match type can be imputed using joint ordered-probit 
estimates of the differences between predicted and observed qualifications of the worker and 
predicted and observed requirements of the firm. 
The empirical analysis uses uniquely-detailed data for British working-age males 
contained in the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative survey (SCELI) to estimate the 
hedonic matching model that identifies three types of educational matches (i.e., overeducated, 
undereducated, and exactly educated) and makes use of its forward-looking and backward-
looking data to show that on-the-job training and promotion opportunities are better for 
workers who are identified in overeducated/undereducated versus exactly educated type of 
match.  Moreover, several wage equations demonstrate that overeducated and undereducated 
type workers have steeper wage profiles that reflect a trade -off between a lower pre-match 
return to human capital with a higher post-match acquisition of human capital or subsequent 
promotion return.  Thus, this study provides the first formal evidence that both overeducation 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
particular types of job matches. 
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and undereducation may occur in labour market equilibrium and that tests of this hypothesis 
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Table 1 : Bivariate Ordinal Probit Resultsa 
 
Qualifications (Q) Requirements (R) 
Variable Coefficient  
Asymptotic 
 t-value Variable Coefficient 
Asymptotic  
t-value 
Mother Out of Work -0.202 -3.466 Professional 1.244 10.806 
Mother White Collar 0.179 0.739 Non Manual 1.045 9.517 
Mother Self Employed -0.242   -0.899 Skilled Manual 0.514 5.060 
Father Out of Work -0.163 -1.797 Employees>500 0.206 3.083 
Father White Collar 0.415 4.554 Insider is Important  -0.056 -0.769 
Father Self Employed 0.124 1.292 Union -0.099 -1.601 
Age -0.006 -2.222 Requirements Nec. 0.767 11.702 
Married at Age 20 -0.259 -2.995 Time to Proficiency  0.150 6.151 
Kids at Age 20 -1.422 -2.815 Years of Training 0.062 2.538 
Work Natural  -0.298 -2.797 Good Promotion Prspt. 0.078 1.204 
Work if Rich 0.084 1.470 Sprvis. Effects Work -0.073 -1.119 
Men are Prime Earner 0.363 5.194 Reorg. in Last 5 Yrs. 0.148 2.470 
Men’s Jobs Come First 0.220 3.305 Part -Time Job -0.223 -0.793 
Public Sector Job 0.279 4.172 Log of Hours Worked -0.210 -1.319 
Hours Worked: 35 -40 -0.223 -1.962 Unemployment Rate 0.009 1.202 
Hours Worked: >40 -0.278 -2.358 - - - 
Supervisory Resp. 0.495 3.481 - - - 
Cowrks. Mainly Men  -0.036 -0.593 - - - 
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.180 3.282 - - - 
Central England -0.168 -2.128 - - - 
Northern England -0.009 -0.104 - - - 
Urban Scotland 0.011 0.141 - - - 
Rural Scotland 0.672 2.019 - - - 
Other Countries 0.014 0.074 - - - 
Constant  0.537 3.128 Constant -0.705 -1.144 
µ2 1.010 26.361 µ1 1.002 22.295 
Number of observations = 1556 
Log-likelihood = -2614.97 
Estimated correlation (r) = 0.573, standard error = 0.030 
a – In the qualification equations, the explanatory variable ‘age’ is continuous while the rest are binary variables 
that equal one if the variable description is true.  In the requirement equation, the explanatory variables time to 
proficiency, years of training, the log of hours worked, and the unemployment rate are continuous while the rest 
are binary variables that equal one if the variable description is true.  The excluded region is Southern England. 
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Table 2 : Predicted and Observed Qualifications and Requirements Comparisons: Percent in Each Category a 
 
Overeducated: Q>R (Number of Observations= 303) 
 R<R* R=R* R>R* Total 
Q=Q* 10.23 10.23 0.00 20.46 
Q<Q* 5.61 0.33 0.00 5.94 
Q>Q* 3.30 63.04 7.26 73.60 
Total 19.14 73.60 7.26 100.00 
Exactly Educated: Q=R (Number of Observations = 1046) 
 R<R* R=R* R>R* Total 
Q<Q* 6.69 7.84 0.00 14.53 
Q=Q* 2.39 53.73 2.10 58.22 
Q>Q* 0.00 6.21 21.03 27.24 
Total 9.08 67.78 23.13 100.00 
Undereducated: Q<R (Number of Observations=207) 
 R<R* R=R* R>R* Total 
Q<Q* 8.21 16.43 3.38 28.02 
Q=Q* 0.48 10.63 43.96 55.07 
Q>Q* 0.00 0.00 16.91 16.91 
Total 8.69 27.06 64.25 100.00 
a – Q  and R are the observed qualifications and requirements that can take on a value of 2 (college degree) 1 (at 
least one A -level) and 0 (no A-level exams).  Q* and R* are the predicted qualification and requirement levels 
from the joint ordered probit model.  Overeducated types of matches are predicted to have R<R* and Q>Q*, 
whereas undereducated types of matches are predicted to have R>R* and Q<Q*.       
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Table 3 : Forward- and Backward-looking Human Capital Specificationsa 
 
 Being an insider  is useful for 
obtaining promotion in your 
current firm  
Previously acquired experience 
and training is useful for 




Coefficient  Asymp. 
t-value 
OEOE 0.219 2.48 -0.245 -2.75 
MATCHOE 0.137 0.97 0.197 1.26 
MATCHUE 0.262 1.94 -0.296 -2.18 
UEUE 0.251 2.41 0.509 4.24 
Years of Education 0.011 0.63 0.053 2.94 
Years of Experience -0.0001 -0.03 0.004 0.92 
Employees>500 0.181 2.44 -0.027 -0.35 
Trade Union Member 0.089 1.30 -0.243 -3.44 
Unemployment Rate -0.002 -0.28 -0.007 -0.74 
Married -0.114 -1.27 0.093 1.01 
Number of Dependent Children 0.067 1.88 0.047 1.23 
First Job was Professional 0.310 2.11 0.240 1.50 
First Job was Lower Non-manual 0.203 2.17 0.168 1.74 
First Job Was Skilled Manual 0.112 1.40 0.240 2.95 
Constant -0.614 -2.44 -0.226 -0.86 
Number of observations 1551 1551 
Log likelihood -1027.40 -939.35 
a  - The variable OEOE (MATCHOE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in 
an overeducated (OE) type match is observed to have qualifications that exceed (equal) requirements.  The 
variable UEUE (MATCHUE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in an 
undereducated (UE) type match is observed to have qualifications that fall short of (equal) requirements. The 
variables years of education, years of experience, unemployment rate, and number of dependent children are 
continuous, whereas the remaining variables are binary and equal one if the description is true. 
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Table 4 : Forwar d- and Backward-looking Promotion Specificationsa 
 
 Very or quite good chance of a 
better job in the next two years 
Job level changes over the 




Coefficient  Asymp. 
t-value 
OEOE 0.306 3.36 -0.205 -2.31 
MAT CHOE 0.200 1.38 1.100 5.75 
MATCHUE -0.038 -0.28 0.871 -6.07 
UEUE 0.114 1.07 0.694 3.76 
Years of Education 0.061 3.54 0.110 6.59 
Years of Experience -0.023 -5.77 0.016 4.47 
Employees>500 0.091 1.19 -0.050 -0.71 
Trade Union Member -0.391 -5.64 -0.199 -3.08 
Unemployment Rate -0.015 -1.72 -0.006 -0.79 
Married -0.096 -1.05 0.035 0.41 
Number of Dependent Children 0.044 1.20 0.111 3.19 
First Job was Professional 0.059 0.39 -2.139 -14.36 
First Job was Lower Non-manual 0.130 1.37 -1.139 -12.14 
First Job Was Skilled Manual -0.016 -0.19 -0.989 -12.53 
Constant -0.231 -0.90   
Threshold 1   -0.558 2.30 
Threshold 2   0.643 2.65 
Number of observations 1551 1506b 
Log likelihood -972.428 -1330.9192 
a  - The variable OEOE (MATCHOE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in 
an overeducated (OE) type match is observed to have qualifications that exceed (equal) requirements.  The 
variable UEUE (MATCHUE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in an 
undereducated (UE) type match is observed to have qualifications that fall short of (equal) requirements. The 
variables years of education, years of experience, unemployment rate, and number of dependent children are 
continuous, whereas the remaining variables are binary and equal one if the description is true. 
b – There are fewer observations for job level changes because some workers have not changed jobs.  The other 
human capital and promotion results are not qualitatively affected if the observations are restricted to the 1506 
for observed job changers.
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Table 5 : Wage Regressions Using Pre-Match Human Capital Interactions a 
 
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Overeducated Match Type - - 0.087 1.91 
(Pre-Match Human Capital)*(OEOE)  - - -0.005 -2.48 
Undereducated Match Type - - 0.104 2.85 
(Pre-Match Human Capital)*(MATCHUE) - - -0.005 -2.11 
Pre-Match Human Capital 0.098 7.10 0.010 7.43 
Tenure 0.046 2.17 0.039 1.82 
Employees>500 0.176 6.60 0.167 6.24 
Trade Union Member -0.007 -0.26 0.006 0.24 
Unemployment Rate -0.014 -4.62 -0.014 -4.73 
Married 0.098 2.92 0.096 2.87 
Number of Dependent Children 0.075 5.75 0.075 5.72 
First Job was Professional 0.196 3.64 0.191 3.55 
First Job was Lower Non-manual 0.114 3.39 0.104 3.10 
First Job Was Skilled Manual 0.074 2.60 0.073 2.56 
Constant 4.493 48.55 4.472 47.84 
Number of observations 1379b 1379 
Adjusted R2 0.1951 0.2015 
a –  Pre-match human capital is a measure of years of education and experience acquired prior to the job match. 
The variable Overeducated Match Type (Undereducated Match Type) is a binary variables that equals 1 for 
OEOE or MATCHOE (UEUE or MATCHUE) workers. 
b – There are fewer observations in the wage regressions than the promotion and human capital models because 
some workers do not r eport earnings.  The qualitative conclusions of the previous promotion and human capital 
specifications do not change if the sample is restricted to those workers for whom there are earnings data. 
28 
 
Table 6 : Wage Regressions with Tenure Interactionsa 
 
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
OEOE - - -0.064 -1.73 
(Tenure)*(Overeducated Match Type) - - 0.005 1.19 
MATCHUE - - -0.076 -1.51 
(Tenure)*(Undereducated Match Type) - - 0.008 2.22 
Years of Education 0.411 6.59 0.041 6.49 
Years of Pre-Match Experience 0.010 7.10 0.010 6.78 
Tenure 0.005 2.17 0.001 0.49 
Employees>500 0.176 6.60 0.172 6.44 
Trade Union Member -0.007 -0.26 0.001 0.03 
Unemployment Rate -0.014 -4.62 -0.014 -4.65 
Married 0.098 2.92 0.095 2.83 
Number of Dependent Children 0.075 5.75 0.074 5.63 
First Job was Professional 0.196 3.64 0.192 3.56 
First Job was Lower Non-manual 0.114 3.39 0.112 3.35 
First Job Was Skilled Manual 0.074 2.60 0.074 2.59 
Constant 4.493 48.55 4.53 48.06 
Number of observations 1379b 1379 
Adjusted R2 0.1951 0.1975 
a – The variable Overeducated Match Type (Undereducated Match Type) is binary variables that equals 1 for 
OEOE or MATCHOE (UEUE or MATCHUE) workers.   
b – There are fewer observations in the wage regressions than the promotion and human capital models because 
some workers do not report earnings.  The qualitative conclusions of the previous promotion and human capital 
specifications do not change if the sample is restricted to those workers for whom there are earnings data.
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Appendix Table 1 : Variable Means for Qualificationsa 
 
Variable Q = 0 
(633 obs.) 
Q = 1 
(530 obs.) 
Q = 2  
(393 obs.) 
Q > R 
(303 obs.) 
Q = R 
(1046 obs.) 
Q < R 
(207 obs.) 
Family Background       
Mother Out of Work 0.403 0.285 0.277 0.281 0.341 0.353 
Mother White Collar 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.011 0.010 
Mother Self Employed 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.010 
Father Out of Work 0.134 0.094 0.069 0.092 0.111 0.087 
Father White Collar 0.057 0.091 0.221 0.109 0.114 0.092 
Father Self Employed 0.077 0.079 0.117 0.083 0.093 0.072 
Work Attitudes       
Age 38.87 35.438 36.962 34.716 37.256 40.696 
Married at Age 20 0.148 0.125 0.051 0.096 0.118 0.135 
Kids at Age 20 0.011 0.004 0 0 0.006 0.014 
Work Natural  0.093 0.066 0.038 0.069 0.069 0.077 
Work if Rich 0.611 0.668 0.715 0.630 0.670 0.628 
Men are Primary Earner 0.158 0.213 0.310 0.261 0.206 0.198 
Men’s Jobs Come First 0.180 0.257 0.293 0.188 0.249 0.232 
Labour Market Attributes       
Public Sector Job 0.156 0.200 0.356 0.205 0.234 0.184 
Hours Worked: 35 -40 0.463 0.489 0.471 0.508 0.476 0.411 
Hours Worked: > 40 0.491 0.457 0.407 0.432 0.447 0.551 
Supervisory Resp. 0.019 0.030 0.109 0.026 0.054 0.029 
Coworkers Mainly Men  0.717 0.747 0.618 0.696 0.703 0.710 
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.427 0.485 0.649 0.465 0.507 0.536 
Central England 0.294 0.283 0.226 0.238 0.273 0.324 
Northern England 0.177 0.183 0.204 0.188 0.193 0.145 
Urban Scotland 0.291 0.370 0.252 0.337 0.303 0.290 
Rural Scotland 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.017 0.005 0.010 
Other Countries 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.023 0.024 0.029 
a - T he explanatory variable ‘age’ is continuous while the rest are binary variables that equal one if the variable 




Appendix Table 2 : Variable Means for Requirementsa 
 
Variable R = 0 
(758 obs.) 
R = 1 
(397 obs.) 
R = 2 
(401 obs.) 
Q > R 
(303 obs.) 
Q = R 
(1046 obs.) 
Q < R 
(207 obs.) 
Firm Attributes       
Professional 0.111 0.161 0.501 0.175 0.225 0.295 
Non Manual 0.165 0.237 0.389 0.264 0.229 0.266 
Skilled Manual 0.358 0.504 0.100 0.307 0.328 0.362 
Employees>500 0.261 0.264 0.327 0.244 0.270 0.377 
Insider is Important 0.773 0.776 0.810 0.799 0.774 0.807 
Union 0.544 0.531 0.476 0.508 0.537 0.473 
Job Attributes        
Requirements Necessary 0.222 0.768 0.778 0.363 0.518 0.643 
Time to Proficiency 0.856 1.802 1.762 1.123 1.315 1.716 
Years of Training 0.349 0.896 1.026 0.652 0.608 0.957 
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.542 0.620 0.786 0.611 0.614 0.700 
Supervision Effects Wrk.  0.259 0.307 0.262 0.287 0.270 0.261 
Job Reorg. in Last 5 Yrs. 0.409 0.401 0.529 0.419 0.424 0.531 
Part-Time Job 0.021 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.014 
Log of Hours Worked 3.670 3.662 3.642 3.671 3.655 3.673 
Labour Market Attributes       
Unemployment Rate 13.267 13.523 12.753 12.905 13.266 13.295 
a - The explanatory variables time to proficiency, years of training, the log of hours worker, and the 




Appendix Table 3 : Variable Means for Career Development States 
 










Years of Education 11.1987 10.8122 12.0000 10.6202 11.5098 
Total Experience 14.9755 15.0440 17.1397 9.2705 16.7633 
Employees>500 0.2794 0.2207 0.4000 0.2658 0.4314 
Trade Union Member 0.5239 0.5070 0.4000 0.5570 0.3725 
Unemployment Rate 13.1845 12.9315 13.0454 14.0684 13.9794 
Married 0.7052 0.6714 0.8154 0.4684 0.7647 
Number of Dependent Children 0.7929 0.7746 1.0462 0.5696 0.9020 
First Job was Professional 0.0703 0.0188 0.1231 0.0380 0.01569 
a  - The variable OEOE (MATCHOE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in 
an overeducated (OE) type match is observed to have qualifications that exceed (equal) requirements.  The 
variable UEUE (MATCHUE) is a binary variable that equals one if a worker who is predicted to be in an 
undereducated (UE) type match is observed to have qualifications that fall short of (equal) requirements. 
